USA v. Miye Chon by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-5-2018 
USA v. Miye Chon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Miye Chon" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 170. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/170 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-4193 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MIYE CHON a/k/a KAREN CHON,  
    Appellant 
 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-15-cr-00077-001) 
District Judge: Hon. William H. Walls 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and FUENTES Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  March 5, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Miye Chon appeals her within Guidelines range sentence for bank 
fraud, embezzlement of funds by a bank employee, and aggravated identity theft.  Chon 
appears to contend that her sentence was both procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable.  Because her contentions are unsupported by the record, we will affirm the 
District Court judgment.   
I.  
Chon pleaded guilty to bank fraud, embezzlement of funds by a bank employee, 
and aggravated identity theft arising out of a three-year scheme to steal from client 
accounts at BankAsiana, a commercial bank where she was employed.  In the 
presentence report (“PSR”), the Probation Office calculated an advisory Guidelines 
imprisonment range of 57 to 71 months on the fraud and embezzlement counts.  The 
PSR also noted a mandatory, consecutive sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment on the 
aggravated identity theft count pursuant to USSG § 2B1.6.  The PSR did not identify any 
factors warranting departure from the Guidelines range. 
At sentencing, neither party objected to the PSR’s total offense level calculation.  
The District Court accordingly adopted the report’s Guidelines calculation.  Chon 
requested a downward variance from the Guidelines calculation on the fraud and 
embezzlement counts.  Chon’s main argument in support of a downward variance was 
that, although she had initiated the criminal scheme on her own accord, she was 
“pressured” to continue the scheme by her supervisor, Mr. Ryu.  (SA25).  The 
Government acknowledged that, during one of her proffer sessions, Chon had told the 
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U.S. Attorney’s Office that her supervisor was involved in the scheme.  Additionally, 
Chon argued that the fact that she was barred from future employment with a financial 
institution, the fact that she had stolen money in order to repay her family’s debts, and 
the fact that she had young children warranted a downward variance.   
The District Court sentenced Chon to 81 months’ imprisonment, two years of 
supervised release, and $1,351,090 in restitution.  Chon’s imprisonment term was 
comprised of 57-month terms on the fraud and embezzlement counts to run 
concurrently; and a mandatory 24-month term on the identity theft count to run 
consecutively.   
Chon now appeals, challenging only the 57 months imposed on the fraud and 
embezzlement counts.1  Chon argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it 
(1) failed to consider her mitigation argument and (2) failed to consider the sentences 
imposed on other defendants convicted of crimes involving similar loss amounts.  Chon 
also appears to challenge her sentence as substantively unreasonable. 
 
 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this criminal case under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction over the challenge to the sentence under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  It is undisputed that Chon filed her Notice of 
Appeal eight days late in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).  Yet, in 
its briefing to this Court, the Government expressly declined to move to dismiss her 
appeal on timeliness grounds.  “Rule 4(b) is not jurisdictional and is subject to 
forfeiture.”  Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because the 
Government has expressly forfeited its timeliness argument, this Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over this case.   
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II. 
 We review a district court’s sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  Our review proceeds in two stages.  United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  First, we “ensure that the 
district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, . . . [or] failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors . . . .”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  Assuming no procedural error, we review the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the totality of the circumstances.  Id.  
“At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of 
demonstrating unreasonableness.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
III. 
Chon primarily contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it 
failed to consider her mitigation argument—in particular, that, although she had initiated 
the criminal scheme on her own accord, she was forced to continue the scheme by her 
supervisor, Mr. Ryu.  As explained in her appellate brief, 
Even though there was no threat of physical injury or the equivalent 
thereof, Mr. Ryu’s threat to report her offense to the authorities and 
placation to follow his direction to correct the matter afterward made 
Appellant regard her at the mercy of him.  As such, downward departure in 
sentencing should have been applied to her. 
 
(Appellant’s Br. at 11 (internal citation omitted)).  Contrary to Chon’s argument, the 
record makes clear that the District Court listened to and considered the parties’ 
arguments regarding Mr. Ryu’s influence.  Ultimately, however, the District Court 
concluded: “Whether it was or was not with the assistance of the supervisor is of no 
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moment to me.  It is what you willingly did and for that you have to be punished.”  
(SA42 (emphasis added)).  The District Court’s emphasis on Chon’s own willingness to 
engage in the scheme demonstrates that it considered, but rejected, Chon’s argument 
regarding pressure from her supervisor.  Failure to depart or vary downward was not an 
abuse of discretion.  
 Additionally, Chon argues that the District Court abused its discretion by failing 
to consider the sentences of other defendants convicted of crimes involving similar loss 
amounts.  In support of this contention, she relies upon 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which 
directs sentencing courts to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities.  By its text, § 3553(a)(6) directs sentencing courts to compare “defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct[.]”  By comparing 
defendants based solely on loss amount, Chon has failed to show that she was similarly 
situated to the defendants in the empirical data she provided.  See United States v. 
Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 833 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[The defendant] has not shown that any of 
the defendants in the District Court cases to which he cites are similarly situated to him 
for purposes of . . . a § 3553(a)(6) comparison.  Even if he had, a mere similarity would 
not be enough to overcome the high level of deference we accord sentencing judges.”).  
Furthermore, by correctly calculating the Guidelines range, as the District Court did 
here, a sentencing court “necessarily [gives] significant weight and consideration to the 
need to avoid unwarranted disparities.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 54.   
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 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it considered, 
but rejected, Chon’s mitigation argument and sufficiently considered the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.2 
IV. 
To establish that the District Court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable, 
Chon must show that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 
562 F.3d at 578.  In reviewing such a claim, this Court is “highly deferential” to the 
sentencing court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
At the outset, Chon’s sentence at the bottom end of her Guidelines range lends 
support to the conclusion that the District Court’s sentence was reasonable.  See Gall, 
552 U.S. at 51 (“If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, 
but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.”).  In any event, the 
District Court’s thorough discussion of its rationale reveals that it permissibly exercised 
its discretion in weighing the sentencing factors.  According to the District Court, the 
magnitude of Chon’s crime, her willful participation in the scheme for an extended 
                                              
2 In her reply brief, Chon argues, for the first time, that the “substantial assistance” she 
provided to law enforcement and her “outstanding employment history” were mitigating 
factors that should have resulted in a more lenient sentence.  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2-
3).  The Court need not address these arguments because they were not raised in Chon’s 
opening brief.  See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204 n.29 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (“As a general matter, the courts of appeals will not consider arguments 
raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief.”). 
7 
 
period of time, her reasons for committing the crime (i.e., to pay down her family’s 
debt), her abuse of a position of trust, and the need to deter others from violating similar 
positions of trust outweighed the fact that Chon was young and a mother of two.  After 
listening to counsels’ arguments, the District Court explained: 
I’m impressed by the circumstances of your committing, willfully, a crime 
of this magnitude over a period of three years.  It was not a circumstance 
where you merely went and stole, temporarily, a relatively small amount, 
but, you stole a considerable amount. . . .  
 
I’m impressed by your use of the identity of others to money launder part 
of your theft.  And I’m impressed negatively in the context that you were 
willingly doing this.  Notwithstanding that, you’re a mother of two and 
notwithstanding that you’re a young person. . . .  
 
You are a bank robber without the typical weapons of violence that 
associates[sic] people.  
 
You are a female Willie Sutton in a sense and for that you have to be 
punished. Willie Sutton was a notorious bank robber who stole because 
that’s where the money was, and you did the same thing.  You stole 
because that’s where the money was.  It’s necessary to punish you because 
of the nature and magnitude of your crime.   
 
Hopefully the punishment will deter others from pursuing the 
circumstances under which you, in a position of trust, abused your trust. . . 
.  
 
So, for all those reasons, Ms. Chon, I characterize you as a bank robber in 
the nature of the crime and I will sentence you accordingly.  
 
(SA42-44).  Ultimately, the District Court concluded that a sentence at the bottom of the 
Guidelines range was necessary to punish Chon for her crime.  The record makes clear 
that this conclusion was reasonable.  
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V. 
 Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the 
District Court.  
